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INTRODUCTION
SECTION I
THE NEED AND ROLE OF MULTIPURPOSE DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN LESOTHO
The post-independence period in Lesotho was marked by a growing 
recognition of the need for strategies 'designed to mobilize and 
direct financial resources into desired channels of developmental 
activities. The rising expectations for higher levels of living, 
the approved five year development plans which declared aggression 
against poverty, more specifically the desire to reduce all forms of 
dependency on the Republic ofvSouth Africa and the emergence of 
industrial development institutions such as Lesotho National Develop­
ment Cooperation created a strong demand for medium term and short­
term finance . The financial infrustructure which a newly independent 
Lesotho inherited, however, was very narrow, with commercial banks 
tending to play a dominant role. Moreover, these banks were 
subsisdiaries of international banks and most importantly, they did 
not provide adequate amount of medium-term and long-term credit to 
local investors. On the other hand Lesotho lacked an adequate supply 
of indegenous financial resources mainly because, like most 
developing countries, its economy is characterized by subsistence 
agricultural production, labour surplus and capital scarcity. For 
reasons both economic and political, this situation was unacceptable 
and was soon modified through the establishment of a series of 
financial institutions particularly Lesotho National Development Bank 
(LNDB).
Lesotho, like most developing countries, is b a s ic a l ly  characte­
rized. by low rate of domestic savings especially when one considers 
the internal economic structures and their ability to generate 
adequate monetary income necessary to permit savings. However, the 
inadequacy of domestic savings rate should not be exaggerated. The
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fact of the matter is that saving rate in this country has been 
found to be fairly high for a variety of reasons; first the country 
has a long history of monetized economy through its comprehensive 
integration with the Republic of South Africa. Secondly because 
of the migrant labour systems which absorb mostly the unskilled 
rural labour and is paying relatively high wages. This condition 
therefore permits the penetration of monetary wage income into the 
rural areas which, given their relative isolation from the commercial 
activities urban areas (lack of physical infrustructure to 
integrate rural areas to urban areas) always found themselves with 
excess money balances. Therefore, while we appreciate that the 
availability of savings hence the rate of savings is high, it should 
be noted that what is really lacking is the efficiency in the process, 
by which savings which are being accumulated in the economy are 
translated into savings useable for productive employment. This 
deficiency has always been covered by the inflow of foreign aid 
and this should be considered only as a temporary measure. That is 
foreign capital, no matter how large the inflow, cannot absorb 
Lesotho from the task of mobilizing domestic resources. In fact 
experiances have shown that foreign capital alone cannot create any 
permanent basis for high standard of living in future and that the 
greater dependence on domestic sources of finance facilitates more 
the successful implimentation of any planned economic development.
Greater dependence on domestic sources of capital, therefore 
requires a wide range of independent, well organized and adapted 
financial institutions which have to mobilize internal resources 
for the purpose of capital formation and allow the capital to be 
invested conviniently and freely into desired development ventures. 
Commercial Banks, the basic component of financial institutions, 
should be thus the major relevant important institutions which 
encourage and mobilize savings and channel them into productive 
investment first, because of their network officies, and secondly 
because commercial banks through normal credit operations often 
activate savings lying iddle both in urban and rural areas.
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Corrmercial Banks operating in Lesotho have, for the most part 
enjoyed free and unrestricted growth. The Barclays Bank (Pty Ltd) 
D.C.O. and Standard Bank, the first banks to operate in Lesotho 
established their branches in the mid 1900s. These two banks 
comprised the commercial banking systems in Lesotho until they were 
joined by Lesotho National Development Bank (LNDB) in 1973, the 
only national bank.
The proliferation of branch offices and mobile units especially
in the districts outside Maseru occured in the 1960s. At the end of
1959, the only two banks in Lesotho had between them, four offices,
the main offices and each with only one branch were all concentrated
in Maseru township. The emergences of bank branches in few districts,
in the 1960s clearly proves the fact that commercial banks, which
follow the traditional system of supply following demands, ^  move
into areas where business is likely to develop rapidly. (Carls
Bernett 1982). As Lesotho's modern sector is mainly a service
(2)
economyv ' with very insignificant industrial sector, commercial 
banking growth rate is likely to be closely correlate or associated 
with rapid growth of the services sector, especially commercial 
distributive businesses, expansion of government administrative 
institutions, expansion of building and construction activity, growth 
of migrants in other regions of the country and, to a lesser extent, 
with the growth of agricultural sector. Thus the emergence, growth 
of commercial banking branches of the two operating banks occured 
in the 1960s as a result of first the expansion of government 
activities into other district particularly at the period of 
independence when government was attempting to take services to the 
. people by embarking upon decentralization policy. In 1965 government 
expenditure rose with the inflow of foreign aid. It could therefore 
be concluded that the two banks moved into districts mainly because 
it was becoming profitable to .provide banking facilities to the 
government civil servants, institutions etc. By the end of 1972, 
just before LNDB came into the picture, the two foreign owned banks 
had between a number of branches and agencies which include the main
v  •
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Bank Brandies and Agencies
Districts Urban Centres Distrcts Population by
Population Urban Centres Lesotho Bank Barclays Bank Standard Bank
Maseru Maseru 257809 55031
4 2 2
Morija 4915 1
' Roma 5668 1
Masianokeng 1
Butha-Buthe Butha-Buthe 77178 7472 1
1
Leribe Hlotse 206,558 6297 1
1 1
Maputsoe 15823 1 1
1
Peka 4577
Berea Teyateyaneng 146124 8589 1
I
1
Mafeteng Mafeteng 154339 8278 1
1
“1
Mohale's Hoek Mohale's Hoek 136312 5276 1
1 1
Quthing Moyeni 88490 3528
1
Mount Moorosi 1 •
Qacha's Nek Qacha's Nek 76497 4837 1
Mokhotlong Mokhotlong 73508 1484 1
Thaba-Tseka Thaba-Tseka 4427 L
TOTAL c=l*216*815= =I2£*2Q2____ „ =18__
1 1
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offices in Maseru, branches in Maseru and other districts and mobil 
u n i t s . ^  Thus, with a total or -ten ■ bank offices throughout 
the whole country, the average nurrber of customers per office is 
121 000 (1966 population of Lesotho 1.2 million). Population 
distribution by districts and urban centres is shown in table 1 and, 
it can clearly be seen that a large proportion of the population did 
not have access to bank services.
However, with the establishment of LNDB since 1973, to 1983 bank
branches have grown and spread into more districts so that all the
three commercial banks have a total of thirty three bank offices
between them eighteen to LNDB, eight to barclays bank and seven to
standard bank. However, it should be noted, as will be seen in the
latter sections, that LNDB has employed supply leading approach to
commercial/development banking and the measuring yard stick for its
performance should not be the same as that used in the case of the
(4)first two foreign owned b a n k s /  '
Until 1970s, the performance of the largely foreign-owned 
financial systems in Lesotho has received no official attention inspite 
of the fact that the country attained political independence in mid 
1960s. The reason for this neglect lay not so much in satisfaction 
with the activities of these institutions as in the emphasis on 
foreign investment and the services provided by these institutions 
to the foreign investors as well as foreign trade. Foreign capital, 
personal and marketing ability of these foreign owned banks were 
expected to provide the necessary instruments of economic develop­
ment while the financial system provide financial booster desired by 
the government and private businesses alike. However, in the 1970s, 
the government became aware of the fact that foreign investment 
depended more on financial resources mobilized internally rather than 
act as a source of funds flowing into a capital-scarce country. That 
is Foreign private companies do not necessarily bring foreign financial 
funds in the country. Thus while foreign investors were providing 
managerial skills and marketing facilities, foreign owned commercial
i
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banks were mobilizing domestic funds to finance investment into these
activities. The net value of foreign investment was less than the
norminal value. The Lesotho economy, after providing financial
resources, is loosing a lot of revenue through (a) tax concessions or
tax h o l i d a y s ^  (b) through tax evasions made easy by transnational
f 5)accounting systems of transfer pricing^ (c) the economy is paying 
a heavy price in terms of interest differencial between the two 
countries (Lesotho and RSA) and between RSA heavy borrowers as again 
Lesotho lenders or surplus spenders. (See section III). The latter 
case is made possible by the fact that, given the commercial banks 
creteria of credit worthiness, and the short-term to medium term 
lending requirements of these banks, funds are always flowing in a 
unidirection manner into RSA and (d) the Lesotho economy is loosing 
income through profit repatration, and high management salaries of 
people who are resident and therefore spending their incomes in RSA 
while effectively, employed in Lesotho.
All these undersireable outcome brought about one simple response 
from the local government politics of intervention in the financial 
system and this is reflected by the emergence of Lesotho National 
Development Bank (LNDB) together with other specialized credit 
institutions (which though important will not be discussed in this 
paper).
The purpose of this study is threefold: First, it attempt to
analyse more fully the major contributing factors to the emergence of 
Lesotho national development bank (LNDB) which, given the competitive 
pressure put up by the traditional foreign owned commercial banks 
(Barclays Bank and Standard Bank) operating in Lesotho had no- option 
but to deviate from its orginal inception and become operationally a 
commercial b a n k . ^  In this regard, the basic proposition is that 
LNDB did not only emerge as a result of an ordinary normal banking 
competition stimulated by profit incentive but largely by the 
government official disatisfaction with the performance of foreign 
owned commercial banks operating in Lesotho. The second purpose is
to focus essentially upon the willingness of both the LNDB and 
foreign-owned commercial bar.k.s to promote and produce within the 
financial system the structural changes which government official 
have expected of them. Thirdly, the study will analyse the 
possibilities and the impact of interest rate differentials between 
Lesotho ard RSA upon the flow of funds in the region.
It is further hoped that the study will have implications for 
government policy making and will have wider application to the 
sub-region as Botswana and Swaziland have followed the same system.
The paper is organized as follows: the first-section deals
with literature review specifically focusing upon commercial banking 
in Lesotho. The second section concentrates on a short note on 
statutory structure and original objectives of Lesotho National 
Development Bank with the view tc illustrate that LND8 is a direct 
result of political intervention in the otherwise free financial 
market system. That Lesotho government officials' belief that 
foreign owned commercial banks are draining funds out of the country 
is not unfounded but based on observed undesirable tendencies. In 
section three, it will be shown that commercial banks' excess 
liquidity and under-utilization of funds over time was not 
necessarily due to lack of sufficient demand for loanable funds.
That the creteria of credit worthiness in the context of developing 
country such as Lesotho is either ill-conceived or misplaced as it 
applies more in developed economics than in LDCS. That the . 
commercial banks characteristic of short-term lending is not 
consistent with the needs of a developing labour-reserve economy 
such as that of Lesotho and other BLS countries. Finally this 
section will show that the interest rate regime as the determinant 
of the flow of funds between two sets of borrowers resident in two 
regions (Lesotho and RSA) of the same financial markets, is 
inappropriate as it forces the poor group to subsidice the more 
wealthier group. In fact it has backwash effects on Lesotho. It 
will be sbown that the statutory structure which establish, Lesotho
Lesotho bank reflects the disatisfaction of local government
official with the participation eprformance of foreign-owned
commercial banks in the economy of Lesotho. The fourth section
discusses the source of funds for LNDB and further points out that
the potential capacity of these source have not yet been exhausted
and therefore LNDB has to be more aggressive than it has been.
(However, the mechanism of its aggressiveness will be discussed in
another study which is f o r t h c o m i n g ) I n  this section, the
immediate identified sources of funds for LNDB are migrants
deffered pay fund (MDPF) Foreign Aid (FA), Government Borrowing (GB)
Net Capital Inflow (NKI). In addition, it will be shown that LNDB
enjoys special monopoly conditions mainly because these sources
are not open for competition by other similar financial institutions.
In that regard, it is instructive to suggest that LNDB's investable
funds permit more than iast short-term and medium term loans. - Hence
• c
the ability to perform a dual functions, Commercial and Development 
Banking.
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SECTION II
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LESOTHO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
BANK (LNDB)
In this section attempt is being made to show that Lesotho 
National Development Bank (LNDB) or in short Lesotho Bank emerged 
partly in response to the growing, yet- unsatisfied, demand for 
banking services in the country and most importantly it emerged as 
a political response to what appeared to be undesirable monopolistic 
conditions enjoyed by foreign Owned Ccmmercial Banks. We wish to 
illustrate that government officials are cetainly unhappy with the 
performance and participation of foreign owned banks in financing 
local economic activities and the initial conception of Lesotho 
bank reflects this disatisfaction. It was hoped that, as a locally 
owned controlled banks, it will redirect the flow of financial 
resources towards priority economic areas of this country. For 
this purpose therefore, it is important to examine briefly the 
government officials' perspective perception of Lesotho Bank right 
from its inception with the view to assess the extent to which 
Lesotho Bank participates in domestic economic activities as compared 
to other banks, its ability and prospects to produce, within the 
existing imperfect competitive financial system, the economic 
structural changes which government officials have expected of it.
The main proposition which this section will attempt to discuss 
is that Lesotho Bank (LNDB) did not emerge as a results of a normal 
banking competition stimulated by profit incentive, but largely 
by the government officials' dissatisfaction with the performance of 
foreign-owned Commercial Banks operating in Lesotho.
As the name suggest, LNDB is a national development bank which 
was created by an act of parliament in 1971, (Bank order No .8 1971 
gazette N o .9 March 1971) though it started operating in 197Z and 
more specifically it is a state bank as against privately owned.
i
Before analysing the developmental aspects of Lesotho Bank, it is 
important to briefly examine1 its characteristic as a.state bank. ;
There are three reasons why it should be regarded as a state bank.
First the Lesotho government is the main if not the only share­
holder. The 1971 Bank order No.8 states the authorized share 
capital of the bank as follows:
25. (1) The initial share capital of the bank shall
be the sum of five hundred thousand rand 
(500,000) divided into five hundred thousand 
one share all of which shall be taken up 
by the government.
(2) The shares in the bank, shall be paid from
moneys to be appropriated by the Council of 
ministers for that purpose.
(3) The government of Lesotho may upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem fit transfer shares
to any person, corporation or public body:
Provided that the norminal value of shares so 
transfered shall, in the aggregate not exceed 
R200,000.
Evidently, by provision of this order, the government is presently 
the only shareholder and, in the event that section (3) of the order 
becomes operative, the government would still remain the single 
majority shareholder. The immediate implications of this is that on 
the political level, the government is jealous of the bank least it 
becomes a private institute and consequently would deviate from its 
initial conceptual objective of being national development bank.
That is private shareholders may strongly persuate the bank to 
become commercial rather than being developmental. It reflects the 
desire by the government to maintain a strick control and to 
monitor closely the activities because a shareholding gives the
-9-
i
r(9)majority shareholder an exclusive voting right/ Furthermore, 
the acceptability of the Lesotho bank by the banking community may 
be the function of the legitimancy of the government within the 
context of local politics. That is one does not have to be an 
expect in banking systems to realize that Lesotho bank, though a 
national bank, does not offer a serious competition to the foreign 
owned South African controlled comercial banks. The most obvious 
observeable fact in this regard is the banking attitudes of the 
business community especially the fo'reign enterprenuers who control 
a substantially large proportion of bankable funds are loyal 
customers of Barclays and Standard Banks. (Here a distinction 
should be made between the number of people who patronize Lesotho 
bank and the volume of financial resources controlled by such 
people).
On the economic level, the implication of Lesotho bank as a 
state bank is that the initial sources of funds are highly limited 
and constrained by government budgetary conditions which, as in 
most developing countries is certainly volotile. Thus, as a state 
bank, LNBD relies largely on government subsidy for the initial 
capital even though it may be argued that savings, deposits and 
reserved profits can be used as the running capital. Lack of the 
public commitment in the bank ownership in terms of investable 
funds will also affect people's attitude towards the bank especially 
when they have to make a choice between depositing and borrowing 
funds with either Lesotho bank or foreign owned banks. The fact 
of the matter is that it doesn't make any difference as both 
financial institutes are providing the same services. The second 
reason why Lesotho bank should be regarded as a state bank is that 
it is exclusively administered and controlled by the state machinery 
thrpugh the Board of directors whose appointment is not the function 
of shareholding but rather the decision of the minister of finance. 
In particular, it should be noted that the chairman of the board 
of directors is the minister of finance who, himself, has 
exclusive rights to appoint his own board. Section 4 of the 1971 
bank order N o .8 reads as follows.
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4(1) The operation of the bank shall be managed and
controlled by a board.of directors who may exercise 
all the powers and who shall perform all the duties 
of the bank subject to the provision of this order.
(2) The board of directors shall consist of
(a) The chairman: and
(b) Not less than three or more than seven other 
directors appointed by the minister.
Thus, the Lesotho National Development Bank will be managed by 
a board of directors consisting of a chairman and not less than 
three or more than seven other directors to be appointed by minister.
It should also be noted that the tank manager who are responsible 
for the day-to-day running of the bank are appointed by the minister 
and are directly responsible tc the board of directors. The 
important point to note and emphasize in this case is that within 
the afore said administrative bank framework, there is no room for 
non-governmental involvement in the bank decision-making. The 
administrative structure presuposes that the appointment of the 
board of directors is made on the basis of banking professional 
merits and competence as against political consideration which include 
both nepotism and rewards to political loyalists. It suggests that 
non-governmental participation in decision making will influence the 
investment decision otherwise in a country which relies on private 
enterprise system. It is quite clear that the government has an 
absolute control over the allocation of financial resources of this 
particular bank inspite of the fact that what may officially be 
percived as priority investment areas may not necessarily be 
regarded as such by the private investors.
The third reason why Lesotho Bank should be regarded as a state 
bank is that the minister of finance can give the bank direction of a 
general character as to the policy be followed in the exercise of 
its functions. Here once again one is being made to believe implicitly
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that the minister Irows it all either because he has been elected 
into that position :n the basis of the expressed Knowledge or 
because of his familiarity with the Five Year Development Plan.
It is quite cl=ar from the preceeding analysis that Lesotho 
bank is a state bar.< and, as such, the main purpose of its 
establishment is t: facilitate the process of development as 
perceived by gover'ir.ent officials. The developmental path to be 
followed in Lesoth:, from the official point of view is stipulated 
in the five develc:ment plans of 1970 - 1975, 1975/75 - 1980 and 
1980/81 - 1985. In particular, the specific role which the state 
bank is expected to play within this broad quitelines is essentially 
as follows:
(a) To increase the level of local savings and their 
employment within the country.
(b) To encourage and faster the development of Agriculture, 
Commerce and industryS 11^
Although the genral objectives of Lesotho Bank are clear and
plausable, it is essential to explain why it was considered necessary
to establish a new bank for that purpose. The question is why is it
that the existing foreign owned commercial banks could not fulfill.
these objectives in the past fifteen years of operation since 1966
It is the view of this paper that "the explanation lies partly in
the economic deficiences of the financial and banking system which
falls within a wider context of the single currency circulating in
the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) and the monopolistic conditions of
South African controlled banks. It lies partly too in the perculiar
perception the policy-makers have about the deficiences in the
performance of foreign banks. Local policy-makers strongly feel
that foreign banks are consistently mobilizing financial resources
inside the country and, instead of employing these funds within
the country, they provide loans, advances and other credit facilities
(121
to investors in the Republic of South Africa. ‘ That even the
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minimum that is employed inside the country, is not necessarily 
directed towards the economic priority areas of this country.
Lesotho bank therefore, is perceived as a strategy to eliminate 
these deficiencies of foreign owned banks and, to ensure a success­
ful achievement of this goal. In this regard, it could be said 
that the emergence of Lesotho bank has both economic and political 
background. On the political level it is convinient to illustrate 
this point by quoting, extensively, from the five year development 
plans which reveals the political dimensions to the emergence of 
Lesotho Bank.
"The First Five Year Development Plan 
stated that it was government's policy to 
increase the level of local savings and 
their employment within the country. In 
accordance with this policy, the following 
measures were proposed.
- To establish a Development Bank whose assets
and liabilities would reach R2 million by 1974/75; 
most of the credit was to be for agricultural' 
purposes.
- To introduce legislation to allow building 
societies to operate in Lesotho.
- To issue development bonds to provide an outlet 
for investment Funds.
The emphasis on the desire to increase the level of local 
savings and their employment within the country is suggestive of the 
strong dissatisfaction with foreign owned banks to perform this 
function. Futhermore, the intention to establish a development bank 
with the sole purpose of financing agriculture leaves no room for 
doubts as to the recognition that the Salvation of the economic 
growth of this country lies with agriculture and to the fact that 
the traditional foreign owned banks have not only neglected this 
sector but have drained resources out of it into the industrial
^  First Five Year Development Plan.
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sector of RSA. National ownership is sought by policy-makers, 
not only for its own sake but also for the control over the 
disposition of resources which it'mobilize. National ownership or 
government control, it is hoped, would bring about an allocation 
of credit more in keeping with plans for national development.
This fact is further emphasized by the second Five Year Development 
Plan which states as one of its objectives
•
"To maximize the mobilization and 
domestic use of national savings."
"The major tenet of Government policy in this 
field remains the same, namely to attempt to 
maximize the mobilization of national savings and 
their productive use within Lesotho."
"The principal means to carry out 
that policy is a well structured system of financial 
institutions. Therefore it is the aim of government 
to improve and complete the existing system by 
having institutions which deal predominantly 
with short-term and medium-term credit Commercial Banks ...
The consistency in the official perception of the functions of 
Lesotho bank, namely to maximize mobilization of domestic financial 
resources and to use these resources to develop domestic economy is 
quite clear and appreciated. Lesotho bank is seen as partly, an 
improvement of the existing deficient financial system while other 
instituions such as Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) 
is another form. The government official's perception of the use 
of mobilized funds by the state bank is evidently relfected in the 
statute that established Lesotho bank. Section 19 of 1971 bank 
order No .8 states as follows:
"The bank may make loan for any of 
the following purposes:
(a) the development, maintenance and 
# improvement of immovable property;
(d) The payment of labour and the purchase 
of supplies and machinery required to
plant, irrigate and cultivate lands 
and to reap and make merchantable
the crop or produce there of;
(e) The purchase of rolling stock, dead and live 
stock and of manure and fertilizers;
(g) The financing of any trade, business or industry.
Thus, while the concern regarding the use of funds implicitely 
suggest that foreign owend commercial banks employ funds outside
the country, section 19 of the bank order specific more directly
that Lesotho bank is expected to finance development of estates 
for industrial purposes, agricultural activities (crop and live­
stock farming), and marketing of both industrial and agricultural 
products.
This govenment official disillusionment regarding the partici­
pation of foreign owned commercial Banks is also shared by the
general public whose expectations are being raised. To this endAJ& /< £
the local-Wes Paper (Moeletsi oa Basotho 27 March 1971) reports 
as follows: ^
"Among other normal functions the development and saving 
bank will provide loans to enable effective development 
of agricultural, industrial and commercial sectors 
of the national economy.
The Bank is the first of a series of national institutions 
that will be formed during the duration of the five year 
development plan in order to assist in the effective 
imp 1imentation of the plan which was approved by the
Council of ministers last month. Other areas of
development in which the Bank will be involved Is 
the reinvestment of funds into the national economy 
and the estaDlishment of a Savings Bank that will also^x 
make provision a life assurance and Savings scheme."
Evidently, the general public had very high hopes about Lesotho 
bank and felt encouraged that for the first time in the economic 
history of this country, the government is establishing a series 
of national financial institutions that will promote the development 
of the local economy. Implicitely therefore, there is a subtle
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assumption underlying the public opinion regarding foreign owned 
commercial banks; and that is these banks are not engaged or 
committed to the developmental needs of Lesotho. Furthermore, the 
emphasis of justification for the establishment of Lesotho bank 
seem to be upon the implimentation of the recently approved Five 
Year National Development Plan. It would appear that the government 
was rather scaptical about the ability and readiness of then 
existing foreign owned banks to provide the necessary credit 
facilities to undertake the implimentation of development plan.
Concerned with the allocative performance of the foreing owned 
commercial banking system is clearly conveyed by the many annual 
reports made by the chairman (Minister of Finance) and academic 
research reports in the past ten years since the establishment of 
Lesotho bank in 1972. In the minister words;
"Once again it is a pleasure to present a report 
and accounts six years since we started. 1978 like 
most recent previous years, has seen tremendous growth 
rates in most vital activities.
We continued to aggresively mobilize savings from 
the nation and with the same tone velemently recycled 
the funds to persons, bodies, businesses, industry, 
construction, infrastructure and development 
projects.
We have enjoyed increasing confidence from 
the nation and as a result have been able to open 
more and more brances in 1978. This we regard 
as one of our prime social objectives." (Lesotho 
Bank Report (1978).
The minister's of Finance view which obviously reiterate the Prime 
Minister pointed is supported by. the1 public opinion which emphasis the fact 
that foreign owned commercial bank do not participate in the 
economic development of this country, but instead they mobilize 
funds for repatration outside the country. Moeletsi oa Basotho 
1971 has this to say in this regard.
VThe formation of the development and savings bank 
falls within government's policy of preventing 
the continued outflow of locally earned money 
to foreign countries; a policy that has been constantly 
reiterated by the Prime Minister during the past 
few months
The single most important point emerging from these essentially 
political observations is the fact that the establishment of Lesotho
Bank is a reflection of government official perception of the
financial problem in that foreign owned commercial banks perform 
the function of draining saving funds out of the country. That is 
Lesotho bank is seen, from the officials point of view as an 
institution which will reduce the rate of financial outflows. It is 
also important to note that even though the policy-makers are in
full comprehension of the magnitude of the financial problem and
are clearly disatisfied with the performance of foreign owned 
commercial banks, they do not see the solution as an out-right 
nationalization of these banks but instead prefer a competitive . 
market approach by establishing Lesotho bank to compete with them.
The evidence presented so far, at least on the basis of 
statutory structure and public opinion, prove beyond any reasonable 
doubt that the performance of foreign owned banks has been 
unsatisfactory. That the present problem of underdevelopment in 
Lesotho could partly, if not completely, blamed on the door-steps 
of foreign owned commercial banks through backwash effects of 
financial resource drainage coupled with cummulative causation made 
possible by the long history of economic integration (product 
markets and labour markets) under the South African Custom Union 
Agreement (SACUA). One would expect that recognition of this 
evidence leaves the government with no option but an outright 
nationalization of these banks with the view to put an immidaite 
stop to these undersireable effects of financial capital outflow.
The interesting question of research in this regard is what are 
the costs and benefits of nationalization of financial instituions. 
What are the necessary and sufficient condition for nationalization
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policy? However, Lesotho government has opted for free competitive 
market approach as the means of reducing financial outflows from 
the country. Lesotho bank cannot concerviably compete successfully 
with existing commercial banks which are not regarded as traditional 
(given their long period of operation in Lesotho relative to 
Lesotho Bank) but are also international or multinational given their 
global sphere of operation. The fact of the matter is that the 
government has prescribed an in appropriate medicine for a genuane 
properly perceived problem i.e. the establishment of Lesotho bank 
while is an essential move in a right direction, is not necessarily 
a sufficient condition of restructuring the financial system with 
the view to put an immediate hast to the continously out flowing 
funds even though other purposes of financing internal economic 
activities are quite plausable.
The political observations and disatisfaction concerning the
performance of expatrates commercial banks are further given a
theoretical support and evidenced by academic emperical research
reports. The academic approach advance a number of reasons for
this annomalous behaviour of commercial banks two of which are;
first lack of government control of these banks both legislatively
and interms of management or administration and, secondly because
of the economic relationship between the Southern African countries
which belong to the Rand Monetary Area under a single currency,
( 14)
the South African Rand. ' These two factors are closely related 
in the sense that the change of the second implies the first. That 
is an effective withdrawal of Lesotho from the Rand Monetary Area 
would imply that government would have to lagislate control of the 
outflow of dunds and the implementation of such regulations would 
require local management of these international banks if not to 
nationalize them. However, the two factors will be treated 
separately for purposes of clearity.
The proposition that the two expatrates commercial banks are 
successfully draining funds out of Lesotho because of lack of 
strick government control over this institutions has been raised
by Mareo Onado and Antonio Poster: 1971.
"Lack of policy-making and controlling powers, 
which was discussed in the introduction, has 
particularly serious implications in the case of these 
two banks. Both have always been more 
interested in atracting local deposits rather than 
in lending in Lesotho, so that their domestic loan/ 
deposit ration is very low. The banks say that this 
is because credit demand does not meet the requirements 
of sound banking. But even though these banks are, 
after all operating in.a developing country, their 
managers seem to be more concerned with what real 
security a prospective borrower can offer than with 
the country's effective development needs."
In the same vein, M. Onado and A. Posteri made similar 
observations about other foreign owned financial institutions; 
specifically, the building societies with regard to the provision 
of investment funds.
"On the investment side, building societies have 
always acted as a channel for draining funds 
away from Lesotho to South Africa. Until not so 
long ago they were actually being barred by 
South African law from investing in Lesotho in any 
form whatsoever, and things have not changed much 
since this prohibition was abrogated ...... "
The Standard Bank Group Annual Economic review written in 
1969, just before the emergence of Lesotho Bank made similar 
observations regarding the South African government prohibition 
ofCommercial banks' investment in Lesotho.
"Because Lesotho is a member of the Rand Currency 
Union, there is no central bank, the South African 
Reserve Bank conducting most of these functions for 
Lesotho. Consequently, the Commercial Banks in 
Lesotho assume an important rle in handling monies ' 
moving between Lesotho and other countries .....77."
The other major financial institutions in Lesoth are 
Lesotho Co-operative Savings Society and the Post 
Office Saving Bank in Maseru. Some savings are 
invested in the South African Building societies,
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but until very recently, under the South African Building
societies Act, they were prohibited from granding loans
outside the republ ic” A recent Act "now permits loans To
be made in Lesotho provided they are sanctioned by the~ c
Registrar ofBuilding societies, but the land tenure
system in Lesotho makes it difficult for loans to be granted ---- "
It would seem to me that the South African government, inspite 
of its advantageous position of being a dominant member in the 
unequal partnership, has taken a concious effort and participated 
in the process of underdevelopment of this country. The fact of 
the matter is that investment funds are not freely flowing within 
.the integrated financial markets in search of profitable investment 
opportunities as expected in a free market system such as this 
operating in Lesotho and South African. Instead extra-economic 
factor interplay to force funds towards a particular region to the 
detriment of the less developed partner. However, this is not to 
suggest that financial flows would have been different in the absence 
of such government logislative measures.
Two most important points emerge from this discussion, the 
first is that foreign owned financial instituions perform the 
functions of draining funds from Lesotho into RSA and it is suggested 
that this underable behaviour can be eliminated by instituting 
strick measures of control. Secondly, it is quite clear that 
initially these banks were prohibited by an act of parliament of 
RSA not to invest funds mobilized in Lesotho but to transfer them 
into South Africa. In this regard, the South African government 
interference in what would otherwise should be a free market 
system is undoubtedly visible. The question that arises therefore 
is wether the Lesotho Government authorities should adhere to the 
free market competition by establishing a bank with the view to 
counteract this behaviour? On what sentimental reasons, (political 
or economic) is Lesotho Bank expected to outcompete the already 
highly protected monopolistic commercial banks in order for it to 
successfully redirect the outflow of funds.
However, the view that foreign owned bank drain funds from
-21-
Lesotho is further discussed by Basil C Muzorewa 1976 (Lesotho 
Notes and Records Vol. 10 1974). He argues that Lesotho, like 
many African economies have suffered for decades from the drain 
of domestic savings to the more financially and economically 
developed countries. He asserts that in 1976 these two commercial 
banks controlled over 90% of total deposits of the whole credit 
system. The main reasons for this commercial bank behaviour as 
he can conceptualize them are as follows:
(a) Lack of comprehensive law'governing the investment 
behaviour of credit institutions. That is there is 
no comprehensive commercial banking legislation in 
Lesotho. The banks are only governed by what they 
consider to be sound banking principle (excessively 
conservative) and the RSA foreign exchange regulation.
(b) Lack of banking lagislative, requiring these banks to 
maintain equality between local assets and liabilities 
also encourage exports of capital funds.
(c) The use of foreign currency as a medium of exchange.
(d) Lack of investment opportunity acceptable to the bank and 
higher interest rates in RSA.
All the reasons advanced by both B.C. Muzorewa and J Gray as 
well as many other studies (see bibliography) explain one important 
point, that commercial banks have successfully managed to effectively 
channelled access cash reserves out of the country for many years.
The alternative solution to this problem is government lagislation 
which will gain the local authority control over these institutes 
and more importantly, Muzorewa goes further to suggest that 
"indegenous credit instituions are more likely to be tools of 
development than foreign owned and managed concerned". This latter 
point, certainly reinforce government officials perception of the 
problem and the fact that Lesotho bank will provide an alternative
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mainiy because it does not suggest an outright national ization of 
foreign owned banks. The main question which remain unanswered in 
this context is how will both lagi-slation and local commercial banks 
achieve the expected objectives within the existing structure of 
monopolistic competition in the financial market? The effectiveness 
of any policy instrument, be it legal or institutional relying 
heavily on moral section, is measured by its approximation to the 
ideal solution. Then what is the institutional or market trans­
mission mechanisms through which policy instruments such as 
establishing Lesotho bank and instituting control lagislation would 
be channelled towards redirecting the flow of funds back into 
Lesotho economy?
However, it is now over ten years since Lesotho bank has 
been established precisely to perform functions which foreign 
expatrate banks are alleged to have delibarately avoided. This 
period is long enough for us to assess the extent to which this 
bank has lived up to the expectations, namely:
(a) To maximize mobilization of domestic savings and to 
employ these savings in Lesotho.
(b) To facilitate the implementation of Five Years 
Development Plans by concentrating funds on officially 
identified priority economic areas.
(c) To finance the service sector particularly the marketing 
of crop, livestock and industrial products.
(d) To reduce the outflow of funds into the Republic of 
South Africa.
As for the lagislative control of .financial institutions, a 
matter which is beyond the activities of Lesotho bank, it will be 
interesting to examine the impact of the Financial Institution 
Act 1973 and the influence or the role played by The Central Bank 
of Lesotho since its establishment in 1978 in controlling the flow
of funds. Jn particular, it will certainly be interesting to 
examine how the central bank facilitate the functions of Lesotho 
bank in its attempt to achieve the above mentioned objectives. 
Thirdly, the establishment of a domestic currency should be seen 
as yet one step toward the desired objective as some studies have 
suggested and, therefore, it would be interesting to investigate 
the extent to which the use of a local currency within the present 
financial market structures of the Rand Monetary Area has reduced 
the intensity of the outflow of savings and deposits generated by 
financial institutions. Although this paper will not attempt to 
analyse the three questions raised in this paragraph, it is 
important to note in passing, the view of the author that the 
impact of these factors would be minimum within the present 
structures and financial arrangements between Lesotho and Republic 
of South Africa. That the local currency today only serve the 
functions of a "national flack" under the current dual currency 
system where the printing and supply of domestic money is backed 
or rather conditioned by the availability of South African rands. 
However, this point needs to be investigated further in order to 
suggest concerete alternative policy issues. For the purpose of 
this paper we wish to concentrate on the question of whether 
Lesotho bank has been able to live up to its expectations. Whether 
the opportunities exist whereby similar indegenous financial 
institutions such as Lesotho bank will emerge in the near future 
to replace the foreign owned banks.
From the foregoing section there are at least three main points 
emerging from the discussion. First, it is quite instructive to 
conclude that Lesotho National Development Bank is the state bank 
which was established with the sole purpose of creating financial 
institutions necessary to finance developmental activities inside 
the country. As a state bank it enjoys certain advantages such as 
being assured of an adequate initial ano running capital allocated 
from the government annual budget. Being under strick control of 
the government it is operating behind the protection of the state
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and would therefore avoid the risk of being subjected to an unfair 
competition against the foreign owned commercial banks. However, 
the opportunity cost of being a state bank is the foregone capital 
revenue which would have been contributed by the public share­
holders. It runs the cost of loosing local expertise which would 
otherwise have provided their services if appointment is being 
done on merit rather than on political considerations and 
affiliations. Lastly, as a state bank it runs the risk of general 
acceptability because it will always be associated with the rolling 
political party and to the extent that the party is' unpopular, 
the bank will suffer as well. This later point will, become more 
evident in the subsequent sections when we examine the degree to 
which Lesotho Bank has competed with other commercial banks.
The second point emerging from our discussion so far is the 
fact that Lesotho government officials and the public in general 
are in no doubt as to the fact that foreign own commercial banks 
are not actively participating in the process of financing 
economic activities in the country. That foreign owned commercial 
banks have consistently drained funds out of a capital scarce 
country into a relatively capital endowed Republic of South Africa. 
That this perculiar behaviour, while on tne one hand may be due 
to economic and investment opportunities deferentials between the 
two integrated countries, they were assisted by extra-economic 
factors such as South Africa's Building Societies lagislation 
which prohibited these banks from investing funds in Lesotho. It 
is in recognition of this fact that Lesotho government officials 
become scaptical about the ability and willingness of the Han 
existing foreign owned financial institutions to provide adequate 
financial resources for the implimentation of the approved Five 
Year Development Plans.
It was further hoped that the success of Lesotho Bank will 
provide credit facilities to agriculture, commercial
activities and industry. It was expected to restructure
the financial system in the country and therefore reduce
the outflow of funds.
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The Third point which clearly comes out as a logical policy
matter, necessary to facilitate the effective performance of
Lesotho Bank to achieve the expected goals and objectives, the
choice between two alternative options open to the government;
first an outright nationalization of foreign owned financial
institutions operating in Lesotho accompanied by a comprehensive
lagislative structure that will prohibite financial out flows.
This alternative would have implications for the present
common currency area. The second option would be to assess the
financial market conditions and, if they are favourable, subject
Lesotho bank to a free market competition as has presently
happened. The immediate implication of this option is that the
current commercial banking activites are far below the potential
capacity of this economy. That the actual banks mobilization of
resources is lower than the potential ability of the communities
to save and invest. In that regard, the newly established
Lesotho Bank would successfully pursue its dual function; commercial
and development banking by simply tapping the under mobilized
resources. However, even under such extremely restrictive
assumptions, Lesotho bank would not possibly reduce the outflow of
funds by other foreign owned banks. In fact it can be argued that
Lesotho Bank can perform the function of introducing and
stimulating banking altitudes and behaviours to the non-banking
rural communiting through its aggressive bank-branches approach
(151
only to loose these customers to other commercial banks.v 1
The analysis of the operations of Lesotho bank over the past 
decade cannot be properly mdade in isolation of the entire 
commercial banking system mainly because of the interelationships 
between the three banks. In fact, it is important at this stage 
to examine ways in which the expatrate banks have continued to 
drain funds out of Lesotho irrespective of the competition brought 
about by the emergence of Lesotho bank. The mechanism through 
which expatration of funds has continued to be channelled out of 
Lesotho are mainly the under utilization of excess liquidity and 
secondly the relationship between holding of foreign assets and 
1iabi1ities.
-26- 
SECTION III
COMMERCIAL BANKS MOBILIZATION OF FI NANICAL 
RESOURCES AND THEIR EXCESS LIQUIDITY
Until 1973 when Lesotho Bank begins to operate, the two 
Commercial Banks, Barclays bank and Standard bank had been 
eminently successful in mobilizing funds in Lesotho. Now again 
the complete privacy whereby data concerning the activities of 
these bank is not available for public consumption, it is not 
possible to illustrate with emperical evidence the amounts of 
savings and deposits made by these banks. However, one can 
savely assume that since they are not charitable organizations, 
their continued existence is a living evidence of the fact that 
they are mobilizing successfully large amounts of savings and 
deposits with high levels of profits. That is they could not 
have been expatrating funds out of the country as pointed out in the 
above sections if they are not enjoying the monopoly of mobilizing 
these funds. It should also be pointed out that even though there 
is no legal minimum required cash ratio set by the government of 
Lesotho, it can be assumed that these banks are using the South 
African stipulated cash ratio as their own in the country. 
Alternatively, given the fact that financial conditions and degree 
of risks deffer in the two countries with Lesotho exhibiting a 
higher level of risk, bank managers would presumeably set a high 
cash reserve ratio considered to be a prudent financial management. 
These two ideal conditions not withstanding, it should be noted 
with emphasis that the question of prodence and the problem of 
running out of cash are not necessarily the major binding constraints 
to the domestic allocation of credit by commercial banks as they 
could very easily obtain the required cash from RSA Central banks 
whenever necessary. Table.3 below shows the excess liquidity of 
commercial bans in the country. The table shows that the average 
liquidity ranges between 58.and 96.5 percent in 1983. The main
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
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TABLE 3
COMMERCIAL BANKS' LIQUIDITY RATIOS
million rands
loans Credit
. . . and deposit
Deposits^ ' Advances ratio
67.48 39.44 58.5
85.32 49.96 58.6
101.14 69.09 68.3
111 .99 90.25 80.6
122.90 117.17 95.3
148.67 121.87 82.0
176.46 167.43
237.16 185.85
246.26 200.83
long-term 
liquid liquidity time
assets ratio deposits
- - -
34.28 50.8 7.6
47.06 55.2 7.94
60.21. 59.5 7.28
82.85- 74.0 .5.58
97.45 79.3* 11 .00
143.44 96.5 9.04
difficulty in the analysis of these important perfovance indicators 
is that there is no data for the period proceeding the emergence of 
Lesotho bank in 1973 and also thac there is no disaggregated data 
for individual banks. Therefore the present liquidity ratios are 
inflated by the inclusion of Lesoth Bank which, as a development 
aand state bank is certainly operating at very high liquidity 
ratio in attempting to provide credit to locals. However, the 
data as presented shows that commercial banks are actively loaning 
out their funds and excess liquidity appears to be very low.
Caution should also be exercised regarding the table in that it 
does not show who are the recipsants of loans and advances.
However, the problem is partially solved when we examine table 
4 and 5 which are presently the assets and liabilities of commercial 
banks. That is the performance of commercial banks can be assessed 
on the basis of the allocative functions which in turn depend 
very much upon overseas assets holidays. Evidently, the fact that 
Barclays bank and Standard bank are subsidieries of foreign 
international commercial banks proves beyond any reasonable doubt 
that their foreign assets will certainly exceed local assets.
The question is whether these assets are the major determining 
factor to their credit allocative performance and profit 
repatration? It is therefore important to examine the growth of 
commercial banks' assets and compare with the liabilities.
TABLE 4
COMMERCIAL BANKS ASSETS
Years Cash
balances
Balances 
with CB
Foreign 
L Assets
Loans & Advances 
Private Sector
Government
Security
Loans & Avancc
Statutory
Bodies
s Other 
Assets
Total
1976
1977
1978 4.72 . .42.11 18.45 10.79 10.20 11.86 98.13
1979 6.67 51.17 23.85 17.55 8.55 19.32 1.27.11
1980 5.74 27.53 33.70 21.45 38.40 9.24 16.49 152.14
1981 5.81 22.79 35.71 33.31 42.66 10.44 26.52 177.24
1982 4.22 24.25 54.92 43.13 54.50 10.92 33.38 225.52
1983 6.12 42.73 72.03 42.66 68.41 10.80 51.75 294.50
1984 8.37 45.65 88.91 59.19 62.28 13.39 59.10 336.89
1985 8.91 69.02 112.13 79.63 73.27 11.26 52.68 .406.91
1986 7.12 95.12 68.01 89.34 94.42 11.42 48.87 414.30
SOURCES: Central Bank of Lesotho Quarterly Review September 1982 Vol.l, No. 2 Maseru
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, In the absence of disaggregated data for individual banks, it 
may not be possible to explain which of the three banks holds the 
largest amount of foreign assets and/or liabilities. We can only 
assume that Barclays Bank and Standard bank are responsible for 
the large overseas assets. Furthermore, it is rather difficult 
to distinguish between foreign assets originating from the Republic 
of South African and those of the overseas origin. However, it is 
quite evident from tables (4) and (5) that net foreign assets held 
by commercial banks are very large both in absolute and relative 
terms. The most interesting feature of foreign assets is that 
they are growing overtime from 42.11 million rands in 1978 to 112.13 
million rands in 1985 Table 4 thereby indicating the growing 
foreign demand for local financial assets. Table (5), last column 
further proves this point in that Lesotho is actually a net exporter 
of financial resources. That is net foreign assets is positive, 
very large and actually growing from 71.15 millions rands in 1980 
to 211.24 million rands in 1986. This shows that foreigners are 
borrowing from the banking system of Lesotho more than the invest 
as the liability are very small. There is thus, through the banking 
system, a consistent drainage of funds from a capital scarce 
economy into the relatively more capital abundants countries of the 
Republic of South Africa and overseas. This situation would, at 
least on the surface, appear to be rather abnormal as economic 
theory would suggest that capital should move from a region of 
high concentration in the face of declining prices, profits and 
investment opportunities into regions of low concentration in search 
of new investment and greener pastures. However, the reasons for this 
abnormal behaviour of capital outflows in the form of assets holdings 
are many; first it can be argued that the high volume of foreign 
assets is a reflection of the scarcity of domestic liquid earning 
assets. The fact of the matter is that over a long period up until 
now, Lesotho government has been largely financed through the loans, 
grants, aid from overseas as well as through customs union revenue.
As such commercial banks do not have opportunities for short terms 
investment in the local assets markets. The choice of liquid
NET FOREIGN ASSETS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
F o r e i g n  A s sets
Commercial Bank
Foreing Liabilities
fear Central Bank 
of Lesotho Total
vhich Rand Notes 
i. 'and coins Total
Gentral Bank of 
Lesotho
Comrercial
Banks Total
tfet Foreign 
Assets
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980 38.40 37.43 3.73 75.83 0.06 4.62 4.68 71.15
1981 40.15 39.77 4.07 79.92 0.25 5.63 5.63 74.04
1982 51.03 56.50 1.58 107.53 1.92 3.48 5.40 102.12
1983 81.34 73.97 1.94 155.31 2.75 23.20 25.20 129.36
1984 96.64 92.71 3.80 189.35 2.83 7.51 10.34 179.01
1985 109.63 116.89 4.75 226.52 2.03 7.91 9.94 216.58
1986 148.99 91.46 3.46 220.45 2.06 7.15 9.21 211.24
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho Quarterly reveiw Vol. V No.1 March 1986.
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assets is between cash, non-income generating assets and foreign 
assets. The question that seems inevitable in this case is whether 
the high level of net foreign asset holding is a reflection of a 
viable domestic capital market?
The second reason for this high excess foreign asset holdings 
could be fluctuating sources of funds for commercial bank as to 
whether these sources are seasonal or contineous. That is if the 
sources of funds for banks is basically -stable industrial activities 
or even in the case of Lesotho, stable migrant remmittences, bank 
assets would be contineously stable. However, in the case of an 
agricultural economy such as that of Lesotho, bank liquidity could 
be the functions of seasonal sale of agricultural produce and, given 
the limitted range of form products produced for commercial purpose 
as well as the unpredictable weather conditions, banks liquidity 
would be highly volotile and fluctuating. Linder such conditions, 
the high level of net foreign assets would be justified on the 
grounds that during the slack season or drought periods, banks cash 
inflow would be tightened and they would have to reduce their 
holdings of local assets. In the case of Lesotho, the two mentioned 
conditions are quite permisable except that they both are not binding 
constraints to the commercial liquidity positions. Thus, a 
disaproportionate net foreign assets as shown by tables 4 and 5 
cannot be justified on the basis of fluctuating and unpredictable 
bank cash inflows.
The thrid reason, which can be more acceptable is that 
commercial banks' high levels of foreign assets is the direct result 
of International trade between Lesotho and RSA as ell as other 
overseas countries. To the extent that foreign trade is the 
dominant influencing factor, one can conclude that foreigners, are 
holding local assets against exports made into these country. This 
point, while it seems to be the main explanatory factor, is also 
debatable in the sense that (Lesotho and RSA are using a single currency 
and as such, there would be no need for excess foreign exchange 
reserves for trade particularly with RSA.
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Whatever the reason for the observed excess net foreign assets 
of banking systern , the main important point to note and emphasis, 
is that Lesotho is the net exportor of financial resources.
Commercial bank liabilities is regarded as the main source of 
banking funds with the view to channel these funds into viable 
economic activities. In fact deposit laifcilities are the single 
most important comparent of commercial banks' liabilitis . Table 5 
therefore gives the distribution of commercial bank liabilities in 
their three principal forms; demand deposit, time deposit ar 1 saving 
deposit. The most clearing feature of commercial banking ~rcm this 
table is that the private sector seem to be the dominant source of 
funds for banks accross the three forms of liabilities. For instance, 
the private sector has the largest contribution in the demand 
deposit and the growth rate seems to be fairly high; from 13.05 
millions rands in 1978 to 59.52 millions rands in 1985. The immediate 
implications of this growing form of bank liability is that the 
commercial banks liquidity is raising, their capacity to create 
money in the form of loans is expanding particularly if one assumes 
that their cash reserve requirements are not rising. The question 
is which of the two markets RSA and Lesotho is the beneficiency of 
loans created by these banks?
It is quite evident from the table that the pattern of distri­
bution is that the private sector is the leading sector in all three 
forms of liabilities to be followed by the government and then the 
statutory bodies. The interesting point to not particularly in 
terms of time and savings deposits is that the large proportion of 
these liabilities come from the rural community which is basically 
surplus spenders. That is rural communities, as can also be 
observed from the deferred pay fund are largely isolated from the 
commercial economy so that their propensity to spend cash income 
is relatively low while on the otherhand, their source of cash 
income, whose function is only to suppliment agricultural subsistence 
output, is very high and consistent. While the rural communities'
demand for bank, loans advances is indeterminate, one can safely 
assume that the posibility of squiring bank loans is very limited 
due to rigide bar,!< requirements such as securities. It is there­
fore instructive to conclude that rural communities are subsidicing 
urban bank customers through the provision of bank liabilities 
without enjoying investment benefits _reated thereof.
However, it is necessary to exolain the observed significant 
growth or commercial tank liafcili ;es in Lesotho. Th;s growth 
can be explained interms of natural tendencies and economic 
conditions in that o'.e-'* a oericd of time, the economy of Lesotho 
has experienced a fairly gh growth of income anc automatically 
bank deposits should grc w . Second-, with the emergence of 
Lesotho National Development 6ar.< and its aggresive banking 
approach, particularly with regard to rural penetration (See t a d e  
1) a lot o f  people have become enlightened with respect to the 
profitabi1 it} cf purchasing of income generating financial assets 
in banking. Thus LNDB would seem to have stimulated banking habits 
by providing banking services to the rural ccmmurities. This point 
is also backed by the observed growing banks liabilities in the face 
of increasing commercial banks. That is if the first two banks 
had efficiently exhausted the potential banking capacity of the country 
over the years of their operation prior to Lesotho bank, one would 
expect commercial liabilities to decline when Lesotho bank is 
established and takes its market share since 1973.
Table 6 also has implications for the degree of monetization 
and banking behaviour of Lesotho banking community as a whole. That 
is in a situation where the economy is completely monetized the 
process of portfolio holding structural change would be for the 
saving deposite to decline over time while time deposit and demand 
deposits grow. There should be a substantial shift in the 
distribution of the structure of deposit in favour of time and 
demand deposits. However, in the case of Lesotho this stage have 
being reached as saving deposits seem to be growing at a higher 
raten than than time deposit while demand deposit is growing at a
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TAI3LE 6
COMMERCIAL HANKS I.IABIUTI FS
Demand Deposit TLMli DKPOSLT SAV I NC DKPOSJ
Years Private Government Statutory Private Covernnu. 
Sector Bodies Sector
C; .',utory Private StnUiLoi y Deferred Capital & Foreign Others Total 
Boil i es Sector Bodies Pay fund Reserves Linbili
 _______________________________________________________ ties.
1976
1977
1978 18.05 4.80 5.46 10.74 2.28 0.06 23.46 0.07 18.28 5.47 2.62 6.84 98.13
1979 26.52 7.14 6.49 13.89 2.21 0.27 127.11 0.05 2 1.. 59 7.44 1.72 12.68 127.11
1980 34.87 13.35 2.09 12.48 2.21 0.66 34. 12 0.08 25.90 9.32 4.62 12.44 152.14
1981 38.66 11.51 5.71 10.27 0.90 1.50 41 .75 O.K. ,.i..23 9.25 5.63 15.67 177.24
1982 37.26 11.56 17.11 14. L7 0.90 0.33 48.34 0.09 50.35 10.53 3.48 .81.20 255.32
1983 36.88 12.44 19.61 15.74 0.90 0.53 63.57 - 58.37 26.01 23.20 38.25 294.50
1984 44.63 12.42 28.72 16.37 - 0.49 73.77 0.06 62.61 30.01 7.51 60.23 336.89
1985 65.46 20.62 35.59 21.75. - 1.99 92.10 0.01 68.9.1 ' 26.63 7.91 70.89 406.91
1986 59.52 21.17 37.88 23.32 - 2.35 102.00 0.0.1 71 .75 31.17 7.15 57.98 414.30
higher rate than savings and time deposits. The main reason for 
this low growth of savings is not so much the portfolio holding 
structural chances but rather, a shift of funds by the expatrate 
business people from locally based commercial banks into banks 
located in the Republic of South Africa either for purpose of 
ccnviniently financing foreign trade or for security reasons.
The credit allocative performance of commercial banks in 
Lesotho can be assessed on the basis of their active participation 
in financing viable major economic activities. Given the dual 
nature of the economy (agriculture co-existing with the service 
sector rather than the industrial section'1 it should be excectsd 
that the two sectors commanding the bulk cf credit are agriculture, 
the distribution sectors and building construction together with 
transport which service all sectors of the economy.
Both theory and the experience of other developed countries 
have shown that as the economy is developing the process of 
structural transformation is such that agriculture declines in 
importance while the service and the industrial sectors become 
mere dominant with the result that agriculture becomes more 
mechanized and commercial as opposed to labour-intensive 
subsistence production. It is therefore logically consistent to. 
suggest and expect that in the process of economic structural 
transformation, agricultural share cf credit will grow in an attempt 
to acquire mechanical impliments and other improved inputs such as 
fertilizers, seeds, insecticides etc.
On the other hand it can also be argued that in the process 
of structural transformation from a predominantly agrarian economy to 
an industrialized economy, the agricultural share of GNP, labour 
employment and aggregate growth rates are falling and, in the same 
manner, it should be expected that total share of labour should 
decline and be shifted to the emerging more competitive sectors. 
Infact agricultural contribution to the process of development 
should be such that savings generated from that sector are
Table 7 gives the distribution of commercial banks' loan and 
advances according to major economic activities and it is quite 
evident that the service sector (wholesale hotel , resturants, 
transportation, storage and communication) is the largest receipient 
of credit. The construction seems to be the second largest 
beneficiary cf bank resources to be followed by manufacturing 
industries while ac iculture is the lowest. Whe-' this table is 
cross examined with table 6, especially -in conjuctian with 
c.lumns c ’ private sector saving deposit, deferred pay fund and 
private sector time deposit, one can conclude that the distribution 
sector is employing household savings. That agriculture is 
contributing largely to the growth of the service sector.
The most pertinent question is why has there been an emphasis 
and shift of credit from agriculture into the service sector when ' 
in actual fact the agricultural sector has not necessarily developed 
to the stage where it could be financing other sectors? Is the 
high growth of the service sector a direct result of the demands 
made upon it by otehr domestic economic activites? The observed 
rather abnormal distribution of loans between sectors could be 
the function of a number of factors such as the concentration of 
ownership of business activities between local and foreign enter- 
preneurs. The service and industrial sectors are completely dominated 
by the foreign owners of South African origin and a few overseas 
businessmen. On ther other hand, the agricultural sector is owned 
by local farmers who are largely peasant in character and have very 
little commercial cash crop production. This difference in owner­
ship and the character has implications for credit worthiness and 
attitudes towards risk particularly from the point of view of 
foreign cwned commercial banks. That is when banks consider loan 
applications, the most important requirements are adequate 
collateral, guarantees and sound credit records. More oftens banks 
require that loan applicants should pleage as collateral, mortagages
channelled into the mere profitable sectors.
TABLE 7
COMMERC]:AL BANKS’ LOArj S AND ADVANCI S TO BUSINESS ; ENTERPRISE?I AND STATUTORY BODIES.
Agri.c
Hunting Mining Manufacturing Electricity Construe tion Who]esale TransporI Non-Bank Cuiiiiimn L t y
fears*. t^ Fishing Quarryi: '8 Gas & Water Hotel & Re: L. Storage E Luancial Social K.
•Forestry Coiimum i-Inst., Personal
cati on Real Serv ices
Estate.
1975
1976
1977
1978 0.23 0.09 0.56 0.72 4. 59 11.60 1 .53 0.12 1.16
1979 0.10 0.01 0.45 0.57 4.26 13.43 L .43 0.88 1 .17 .
1980 0.29 0.04 1.08 0.61 4.09 10.37 1 .32 1.23 1 .36
1981 0.88 2.56 2.95 0.46 5.05 18.6 L L. 56 1.72 1.31
1982 0.31 4.98 4.08 2.10 2.68 23.89 2.4L 1.86 1.77
1983 0.32 0.39 4.67 2.27 3.55 23.64 2.14 L. 73 1.54
1984 0.35 — 4.88 5.67 5.97 29.22 2.26 2.18 4.61
1985 0.52 - 5.20 7.06 6.48 30.66 3.20 3.24 1.93. .
1986.
cn urban properly, insurance policies, fixed deposit etc. As a 
result, prooertyless customers, whose savings are both short-term 
and small in volume, find it mere difficult to obtain a loan than 
big businessmen who also enjoy the monopoly of credit guarantee 
provided by local institutions such as INDC^1^ .  Therefore 
mechandise trade and manufacturing have credit advantage ever the 
agriculrtural sector.
Now given the initial objective of Lesotho 3ank, one would 
expect agricultural credit to be rising since 1373 yet the growth 
of credit to this sector is very low. However, cn the oasis of 
available aggregated data is not possible to explain the degree 
to which Lesotho bank has participated in the agricultural 
finance.
SECTION IV*
MONOPOLIST!C CONDITIONS OF STANDARD AMD BARCLAYS BANK
This section attempts to illustrate the fact that Lesotho 
:ank has net made any impact on the operations of the expatrates 
tanks in term- of reducing the volume of their generated savings.
That is Lesotho bank was subjected to an unfair competition which, 
while on tne one hard encouraged to be more aggressive and 
innovative with the aim to catch-up, has effectively diverted 
th local bank from its original conception of teing a development 
ba: .< .nto commercial orientation. To this end, it will be 
appropriate to examine the advantages which barclays bank and 
standards banks have over Lesotho Bank.
The monopolistic conditions of these two banks is largely 
cetermined cy three main factors, peoples' attitudes towards them 
as against the local state bank. Secondly their international 
position as multinational banks and thirdly because they offer 
a variety cf financial assets. In order to illustrate these 
points on the theoretical level, ir ia important to briefly review 
conditions of imperfect competition in a financial market. That 
is what do we understand by a monopoly bank and in what way are 
the three commercial banks operating in Lesotho enjoying monopolistic 
conditions?
Theoretically, a free competition economic model depicts an 
economic system in which consumer are free to buy the goods they 
want and they seek the products they want in the market of their 
choice. Workers can sell their services in the most advantageous 
market . Producers are free to buy their raw materials where they 
will and, though not possibly as free as consumers, are reltively 
free to hire the needed workers in the most advantageous markets.
The price structure performs an economic service of great importance 
in that the decisions to produce what and how much are based largely
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on the ultimate income derived therefore. The model therefore 
suggest that market prices and market popularity (free flow of 
information) quide production. By quiding production, market prices 
determine the use made of economic resources. Market prices also 
have a bearing on the way in which income is distributed.
Imperfect competition, model (monopoly) though not a complete 
contrast of the perfect competition, pre-supposes the existence of 
a single or few sellers sharing a large market with relatively elastic, 
(not perfectly elastic) demand. Monopolistic conditions can be a 
number of factors such as direct government interference through 
lagislation and protection regulations, restrictions or moral 
suation; it can be a result of excessive advertisement (popularity), 
amalgamations or patent rights; it can also be the result of frag­
mented market structures created by imperfect physical and social 
infrastructure, technological advantage and institutional structures 
such as that exist in the Southern African Rand Monetary Area. That 
is the use of a single South African currency in the region is an 
institutional factor which gives the South African banks a monopoly 
over the indigeneous banks of the peripheral countries such as 
Lesotho bank. Lastly, monopolistic condition can also be created 
by the marketing ability and accessibility to foreign market of 
certain businesses. Marketing ability and international pupularity 
lend themselves to credit worthiness in the international market, 
a factor which potential infact competitors cannot affort, hence 
monopoly.
Financial markets are following precisely the same model. 
Individuals are free to save or spend their incomes as they choose.
If they spend their incomes, the proceeds flow through commodity 
market. If they save, they may put the funds to work directly in some 
form of real productive capital. Most savers, however, do not 
have the means for doing so, as a result a large fraction of 
individual savings is channelled through financial markets. The 
parallel aspect is that individuals and groups formed into business
i
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cooperations are free to operate productive economic*enterprises 
from which they hope to realize a profit. Eoth individuals and 
business frequently need to find outside sources of financial 
capital to aid them ir. their enterprises.
The price in financial markets is rather special: It is a
money price on the use of money (interest rate). This price is the 
cost to the borrower and income to the lender.
Commercial banking, in Lesotho, particularly the two foreign 
owned banks (Barclays bank and Standard bank) exhibit monopoly 
characteristics of financial markets. The four most important 
charracterisitcs of monopoly enjoyed by these banks are informational 
secrecy, international popularity and local good will, the variety 
of financial scurities and international branch system which make 
it conviniant for expatrates as well as foreign companies to 
undertake their transactions at different places and countries.
Informational secrecy. It has always been difficult for 
researchers and policy makers to acquire the necesary information 
regarding the operation of the two foreign banks. Most studies, 
(Musorewa, Gray, Monado and A. Porteri) consistently make the 
excuse of inavilabi1ity of adequate published data. The annual 
reports of these two banks simply publish their international 
operations and are never specific on any single country. Even the 
aggregate figures about the banks activities are protected by this 
secrecy which we believe is necessitated by the desire to prevent 
others from knowing their rival's precise situation and market 
shares. This banks are presently required by law to submit their 
financial position (The law does not require them to publish their 
accounts) and if this condition is observed, it would appear that 
the Lesotho government is also unwilling to divulge this information, 
thereby perpetuating monopoly conditions of commercial banks.
However, we strongly believe that the commercial banks' private 
interest should be sub-ordinated to the general public interest of 
having full information about their complex activities.
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International Reputation both Barclays bank and Standard bank 
have international network operations with offices and branches in 
a number of countries. This international recognition gives them 
a greater publicity with the result that their world market shares 
far out-weighs that of any single countries' indegeneous banks.
Their marketing techniques and the range of banking services are 
much wider and more sophisticated so much that no single country 
banks can affort to compite with them even at the local level.
Financial Securities. Commercial banks are interested in 
attracting deposits, and to do so they employ a varity of techniques 
and sell different financial securities. The two foreign banks 
operating, in Lesotho accept money on the following types of accounts 
within a monopolistic market structures: A large proportion of
depositors comes from the business and cooperative communities and 
these prefere current accounts securities because of their 
convi nience.
There are a number of reasons why these banks enjoy monopolitic 
condition in the sale of current accounts securities. In the first 
instance, these banks have an international network and are 
largely operating in RSA. This has resulted in a growing confidence 
for the market to accept their cheques as money. Thus the business 
communities who have to undertake their transactions mostly in RSA 
and in other countries, find it convinient and necessary to keep 
current account deposit with these banks. It should be noted that 
the business communities such as traders, cooperatives, wholesalers, 
building and construction and manufacturers control a large 
proportion of bankable financial national income and as such the 
■market share controlled by this banks in Lesotho, on the basis of 
confidence, strategic location and international networks is very 
large. The second monopoly area of financial securities is the 
saving deposit which is concentrated largely in the household 
sector. Again the basis of monopoly in this financial security is 
the popularity of these banks which-are largely regarded as traditional 
rather than foreign banks. The household sector has grown used to
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this banks overtirre and have developed confidence in them as 
opposed to newly established commercial bank such as Lesotho bank. 
Secondly, cash income acruing to the household sector is 
generated by the migrants and civil servants in Lesotho. As regard 
migrants, it can be argued that a migrant worker would have learned 
the use of banking facilities in RSA and that determines his choice 
of banks as a bank consumer. Secondly it is quite convinient for 
the Basotho miners or factory workers in RSA to deposit their 
savings in South African banks becuse they are very near to their 
working place. The consumer choice between South African banks would v 
be bias towards Barclays banks and Standard bank because they operate 
both in Lesotho and RSA. In the case of civil servants, the major 
influencing factor is the cheque system of paying salaries by the 
government. That is since Lesotho government pay its employees 
by cheques and in the past the only two commercial banks were these 
foreign owned, it follows that civil sevants would have saving accounts 
with the two banks. Now through the multiplier process, civil servant 
businesses, their employees and other complimentary activities would 
need to have some banking relationships with these two banks. Thus 
saving deposit, whether by the household sector or business community 
would be made with both Barclays bank and Standard bank because cf 
this monopoly condition. The popularity of these tanks with the 
household sector is clearly shown by the minimum required balance 
for any savings book held. For example as early as 1972 when 
Lesotho bank emerge, these two banks had already set a minimum limit 
for savings deposit at ten rand (R10) for Standard Bank and twenty 
rand (R20) for Barclays. Yet this did not discourage household 
customers nor did they loose them when Lesotho bank emerged. Today, 
these two banks require a minimum balance of hundred rands (R100) 
for any savings book.
Fixed deposit Securities. The two main sectors which supply 
fixed deposit to commercial banks are business community and cooperatives 
as well as other financial institutions such as insurance companies.
The household sector plays an insignifican role in fixed deposit
i
i
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securities with the exception of the foreign or expatrate community 
which is mostly motivated by the need to expatrate income abroad 
for purposes of purchasing a house, meeting education expenses at 
home or buying shares. However, the important point to note here 
is that these two banks are enjoing moriopolitic conditions in 
mobilizing fixed deposit securities mainly because of the nature 
of the sector which participates in this financial asset.
Lastly, the monopoly condition is further created by the strong 
backing which these two banks enjoy from their individual mother 
companies abroad. These banks do not have to survive by their own 
competitive activities of mobilizing funds in isolation. For 
instance, Barclays bar.k is vertically connected with the "Barclays 
Development Corporation" in London while Standard bank is connected 
to "Standard Bank Finance and Development Corporation" in London 
too. However, for administrative purposes, the Lesotho branches 
are controlled by headquarters, located in the Republic of South 
Africa. As such they are completely integrated in South African 
banking system so much that they look toward RSA central bank as a 
"lender of last resort" while they receive their instruction directly 
from London.
The above analysis should not be interpreted to mean that 
Lesotho National Development Bank (LNDB) is a perfect competitor 
in an environment characterized by imperfect competition. It is 
important to show that Lesotho Bank is not an exception to this 
rule of monopolistic financial market structure. That is it also 
enjoys certain previlages available only to a single state bank.
The five most eminant factor which determine monopoly conditions of 
Lesotho bank are: the local government preferential treatment, 
migrants deffered pay remittances, custom Union Revenue, foreign 
aid and grants and compulsory savings including pension funds.
i
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As a state bank, Lesotho bank is guaranteed a study flow of 
government budget which account for part of its working and fixed 
capital. This means that the bank does not have to market its 
shares to the general public in order to raise the initial end 
expansion capital. It does not have to convince the public or 
shareholders whenever part of the profits have to be ploughed 
back and most importantly, the government capital grant is almost 
interest free. Secondly, with the government acting as a 
guarantee for loans of both businesses and personal (car advances) 
the bank can affort to increase its coverage of the loan market.
It can also manage to provide these loan facilities even at the 
interest rates for as long as the government perceive the investment 
as essential. In this regard, Lesotho bank has the monopoly of 
stimulating banking activities in communities and places where such 
opportunities are not known. Thirdly, as a government institution 
it has the advantage of being generally accepted by the community who 
feels that the government is the gardian of its interests. The 
government can therefore use the process of moral suation and its 
communication and news media tc pupularize the state bank. People's 
choice between foreign banks and the local state bank would be mere on **. 
the basis of political and social attitudes rather than the services 
provided by these banks. In this regard, a proposition emerge that 
the higher the popularity of the government, the more acceptable is 
the state bank. That is in a free choice society, state bank 
acceptability is positively related to the government legitimacy.
M igrants deffered pay remittances. The growth of Lesotho bank 
household saving deposits has been greatly enhenced by the 
establishment of deffered pay*Act of 1974. By the provision of this 
Act, migrants are r e q u e s t e d  to remit about sixty percent (60%) 
of their monthly salaries to Lesotho bank for period of two years.
This people can withdraw all or part of their savings including 
interest at the end of their contracts in RSA mines. The importance 
of this arrangement to Lesotho bank market share of saving deposit 
securities is that migrants households are not free to choose 
between commercial banks.
i
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They are compelled by the condition of convinience to open 
an account with Lesotho bank because of the special service 
provided. Now assuming that migrant remittances form a large 
proportion of rural household cash income it is conclusive to 
assert that Lesotho bank monopolies the rural banking community 
particularly with important aspect of -the deffered pay provision 
to Lesotho bank is the period of time it takes for the migrant 
to withdraw. The period ranges from the minimum of six months 
to twenty four months (two years). This implies that Lesotho bank 
is assured of a pool of funds which remains stable for at least 
two years. This pool can grow for a variety of reasons; for 
instance when migrant earnings increase overtime, when migrant . 
employment opportunities increase and when migrant extent their 
period of staying in the mines beyond the period of two years.
This latter case seem to be more operative in recent years because 
of the new mine system of allowing for weeked visits and cutting 
on leave periods. However, the single important point to note 
about migrant deffered pay arrangement is that Lesotho bank enjoys 
a previlage which other banks don't have.
Customs Union Revenue Deposit. The 1969 custom union 
agreement between Lesotho and RSA provides that Lesotho should 
get customs revenue for goods imported into the region. This 
revenue, which form a substantial part cf the government income 
is usually deposited into Lesotho bank most probably, interest 
free. This will certainly provide Lesotho bank with a large 
amount of liquid assets thereby marketing it possible for it to 
expand its loan supply beyond fhe minimum deposited in current 
accounts. This condition is certainly comperable to the two 
foreign banks who may never face the problem of liquidity shortage 
as they can always get funds either from South African central 
bank or from the mother companies in London. Therefore, in term 
of liquid assets, which determine the commercial banks ability 
to supply loans, is not completely worn off though its minimum 
cilling is constraint by the amount'deposited by-the government,
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In fact this excess capacity is highly dependent on the extent 
to which Lesotho government uses this customs revenue income for 
recurrent expenditure and if so, it depends largely on the 
average residual held by the bank during the receipt intervals.
Foreign aid and grants. The foregoing analysis of Lesotho 
bank's excess capacity to extent loans beyond current account 
deposit is also augmented by the inflow of foreign and grants 
which are mostly in foreign currencies. Since Lesotho bank will 
not necessarily keep these foreign exchange reserves but will 
deposit them with either the Central Bank of Lesotho or abroad, 
it follows that its liquid assets reserves will be higher thereby 
giving it the opportunity to attract the business community, 
particularly those engaged in foreign trade sector of the economy. 
However the extent to which Lesotho bank can use this favourable 
condition to its advantage and succeed to increase its market 
share of the business communities depend largely on a number of 
factors. It depends on foreign exchange control regulations and 
also on the rate at which Lesotho government recurrent expenditure 
runs down both the custom union revenue and the foreign aid and 
grants income. However, these are the two main monetary instruments 
which Lesotho government can use to support the state bank against 
the imperfect competition offered by foreign commercial banks.
The last but not least monopoly condition which is open to 
Lesotho bank is the preferential treatment which the government 
can provide. In this regard the government can allow the bank to 
create loans for below the ten percent reserve requirement. It 
can make it a rule that all the cooperatives.credit union, credit 
societies and other .specialized credit institutions which are 
mobilizing savings at the gross roots level should deposit their 
funds with Lesotho bank. This extra economic factor does not 
only gives the indegenous bank monopoly over foreign owned banks 
but also guarantees that rural funds are used to finance the 
development process of the rural economic sector.
In condlusion therefore, it can be asserted that commercial 
banking in Lesotho is characterized by monopolitic competition 
based on market segmentation, institutional structures and 
international facilities. The process of banking product 
differentiation is not so much based on advertised, salesmanship 
and other usual business techniques instead it is based oh 
profit accumulation, international reputation and institutional 
support from either parent companies or government. It is clear 
then that the establishment of Lesotho bank cannot be understood 
without or oppreciation of the nature and functioning of the 
foreign owned commercial banking system. It is therefore important 
at this stage to examine in section III, ways in which these banks 
drained funds out of the Lesotho economy. For this purpose, we 
will first begin by discussion the process of mobilizing funds 
and the under utilization of excess liquidity. Secondly, we 
analyse the problem of repatrating funds through holding of over­
seas asserts and the interest rate regime.
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FOOTNOTES
1. H.T. Patrick 1956
2. Carla Barnett (Commercial Banking in Beliza) argues that 
bank branches almost invariably move towards emerging & 
dynamic industry.
3. Barclays Bank report 1973 : Economic conditions in Lesotho
4. See Basil Mozorewa 1976 and H.T. Patrick 1966.
5. See A. Seidman 1982.
6. Lesotho Bank is actually a Commercial Bank using similar 
interest rates as others.
7. A paper of the aspects of marketing financial assets is 
forthcoming. The main focus of the study is to analysis 
the major contributing factors to the success of Lesotho.
8. The emphasis is mine.
9. There is a controversy over the issue of majority voting permitted 
by shareholding and active decission making which is usually done 
by the managers. The Lesotho Example of contract management and 
LNDC majority shareholding in most companies shows 'that 5!% 
majority shareholding does not give Lesotho government an absolute 
control over the companies.
10. First Five Year Development Plan 1980-1985.
11. First Five Year Development Plan 1980-1985
12. Series of Prime Minister's speaches on the justification of the 
Second Development Plan 1971.
13. Moeletsi oa Basotho Vol. 29 No.1820 27 March 197
14. Muzorewa
15. See P.M. Senaoana forthcoming paper on the rural banking 
approach by Lesotho. The paper argues that Lesotho bank has 
successfully penetrated the inaccessible regions of Lesotho 
to introduce banking concept and behaviour yet because of 
the migrant labour system, rural customers have found it 
conviient to open savings accounts with South African banks.
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